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Abstract
We model career design as a recursive contract design problem in an
overlapping generations ﬁrm. Agents live two periods. In period 1 they
may be hired as employees, paid a wage, and produce output. In period 2
they may be promoted to become joint owners (partners) of the ﬁrm, pro-
ducing no output directly, but setting the rules and receiving the residual
income. Professional partnerships, such as the traditional law ﬁrm, are
often organized like this.
Employees are motivated not only by the wage but by the possibility
of promotion to the partnership, and the opportunity to set the rules in
the next period; the reward structure is thus recursive. The contracts that
emerge in this environment are always ineﬃcient. In many circumstances
the ineﬃciency takes the form of “rat-race” contracts that specify very
l o ww a g e sa n da ni n e ﬃciently high level of eﬀort.
This conclusion seems to be robust to a range of variations in the
environment.
Keywords recursive contracts, mechanism design, overlapping genera-
tions, rat-race.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Firms are ongoing organizations. Individuals join them when they are young,
hoping to make a career. As their career develops, they hope to move to positions
of greater responsibility and autonomy, to gain greater rewards, and to exert
some inﬂuence over the direction of the ﬁrm.
This process can be observed in all large organizations, but it is particularly
clear in ﬁrms that are organized as professional partnerships; for example law
ﬁrms, accountancy partnerships and management consultants. In these ﬁrms
the career path leads towards ownership rights and the ability to make (or at
least to contribute to) management decisions, unrestricted by external owners.
In these ﬁrms the employment contract is recursive: the reward for one cohort
derives, at least in part, from the right to choose the contract under which
1the next cohort will work. This leads to a dynamic programming problem in
contract design.
Career design and dynamic (but not recursive) contracts have been studied
quite extensively; see for example Holmstrom [10], Gibbons and Murphy [8],
and Meyer and Vickers [12]. Work norms and career design in an overlapping
generations ﬁrm have been discussed by Cremer [4] and, in the context of law
ﬁrms, by Carr and Matthewson [3], Gilson and Mnookin [9], Galanter and Palay
[7], O’Flaherty and Siow [13], Ferrall [5], and Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [11].
Staughton and Talmor [14] have recently considered managerial compensation
as a mechanism design problem, but not in a recursive context.
One theme of this literature is the “up or out” nature of typical contracts,
and the emphasis on low wages and deferred rewards that are paid only to the
successful. Another is the pervasiveness of what appear to be ineﬃciently high
work levels, or “rat-race” contracts (see also Akerlof [1]).
In this paper we will focus on the nature of recursive contracts, which we
view as a contract design problem in an overlapping generations environment.
We consider here the simplest case, with full information and identical agents.
This will allow us to isolate the recursive contracting structure from any eﬀects
of imperfect information. The results are thus free from any adverse selection
or moral hazard eﬀects. In particular, the source of the rat-race that we will
ﬁnd is distinct from that identiﬁed by Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [11] (which
is driven by unobservable shirking within partnerships). Recursive contracts
under adverse selection are discussed by Bardsley and Sherstyuk [2].
In a recursive environment, there is an ambivalence in the attitude of agents.
On the one hand, as in any principal-agent relationship, the agent prefers a soft
contract with low eﬀort and high rewards. But on the other hand, the agent
may well become the principal in the next period, and can see the virtues of a
harsher contract, especially if this or a similar contract can be imposed on the
next generation of agents. We ﬁnd that, as a result of this ambivalence, in many
circumstances principals will design and agents will accept ineﬃcient contracts
that specify low wages and an ineﬃciently high level of eﬀort. This conclusion
seems to be robust to a range of variations in the environment.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set out the basic,
risk-neutral model, under both ﬁnite horizon and steady state assumptions. One
of the implications of risk neutrality is that the ﬁrm may grow very large, even
though this may impose a highly risky contract on the agents. In Section 3 we
explore the implications of risk aversion, and also the eﬀect of congestion costs
associated with increasing the principal’s span of control. Finally, in Section 4
we discuss some implications of the results.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
There are n agents born each period, and each agent lives for two periods.
Utility is separable between periods and there is no discounting; all agents are
risk neutral.
2There is a single ﬁrm. An agent who is born at date t is, with probability σt,
oﬀered an employment contract (wt,πt,b t) with the ﬁrm. This contract speciﬁes
aw a g ewt, a promotion probability1 πt, and an output level bt. Unemployed
agents, and agents who reject the contract, receive a reservation utility of 0 in
both periods. Agents who are not promoted leave the ﬁrm and receive 0 in the
second period. Partners exert no eﬀort, and they share the partnership proﬁts
equally. Thus they have no diﬃculty in agreeing on the objectives of the ﬁrm.
To simplify notation, write w = wt for the current period wage, w+ = wt+1
for the next period’s wage, and w− = wt−1 for the previous wage. A similar
notational convention will be used for other variables.
Let
W = nσ (b − w) (1)
be the current partnership proﬁts (in period t). Let
m = nσ−π− (2)
be the number of partners in the ﬁrm in period t. Agents will accept the em-







where e(b) is the cost of exerting eﬀort. We make the following assumptions
about the eﬀort function:
Assumption 1 The eﬀort function is smooth, increasing, convex, and e(0) =
0.
Assumption 2 There exists an output level b such that b>e (b); (otherwise
the optimal production level will always be 0).
Since the partners are identical and share equally, they will choose (σ,w,π,b)
to maximize the total partnership proﬁt (1), subject to the participation con-
straint (3) and the feasibility constraints w ≥ 0,b≥ 0, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, and
0 ≤ π ≤ 1. After eliminating w and π the constraints can be rewrittenW
n ≤ σb,
W
n ≤ σ (b − e(b)) +
W+
n , b ≥ 0,a n d
m+










subject to b ≥ 0,a n d
m+
n ≤ σ ≤ 1.
We note that a solution to this maximization problem always exists, since
σ is restricted to a compact interval, and σ (b − e(b)) +
W+
n is coercive in b (it
is negative outside a compact interval, so we can restrict b to this interval). It
is also clear that the individual rationality constraint always binds, for if it did
not then W
n could be made arbitrarily large, violating the existence conclusion.
1Explicit randomization in promotion is unlikely to be seen, but in practice the uncertain
nature of the business environment does the job just as well. When promotion time comes
round nobody is sure exactly who will be promoted, as it depends on a variety of uncertain
factors. But everybody has a good idea of who is likely to get up and who is not; and
sometimes there are surprises.
32.1 Preliminary Remarks
We show ﬁrst that, under these assumptions, all agents will be employed.
Lemma 1 (full employment) σ =1
Proof. We consider separately three cases, showing in each case that W is
increasing in σ.
If W = nσb>n σ (b − e(b)) + W+ then W is clearly increasing in σ.
If W = nσ(b − e(b)) + W+ >n σb, then b maximizes (b − e(b)). But by
Assumption 2 this function takes non-negative values. Thus (b − e(b)) > 0.
It is also clear that this optimal value of b does not depend on σ. Thus W is
increasing in σ.
Finally, if W = nσ(b − e(b)) + W+ = nσb, then we can write b = b(σ) and
W = W (σ) as functions of σ, and we have W (σ)=nσb and W+ = nσe(b(σ)).
Writing the derivative as a dot, ˙ W = nσ˙ b+n˙ σb and 0=nσe0 (b) ˙ b+n˙ σe(b), so






. So W is increasing in σ provided that the eﬀort elasticity
be0(b)
e(b) > 1. That is to say, provided that the marginal eﬀort exceeds the average
eﬀort; but this follows from Assumption 1.
Bardsley and Sherstyuk [2] show that if there are hidden types then this
result may no longer be true. Adverse selection and information eﬀects may
endogenously limit the size of the ﬁrm.
Corollary 1 The contract is invariant to the size of the partnership.
Proof. Since the constraint
m+
n ≤ σ does not bind, the contract is indepen-
dent of the value of m+.
The intuition is straight forward. Firm proﬁts depend only on the actions
of the agents. For a given future level of proﬁt W+, the proﬁt per partner is
W+
m+, and the probability of promotion is
m+
nσ , so the expected future proﬁtp e r
employee is
W+
nσ . Doubling the number of partners halves the proﬁtability of
partnership but doubles the probability of becoming partner. To risk neutral
agents this is the same.
Thus, under the assumptions made here, it is always proﬁtable to employ all
agents, but the size of the partnership is indeterminate. There may be a single
principal (m =1 ), with the probability of promotion being 1
n, or there may be
many principals (m = n), with the probability of promotion being 1.
We can also interpret an m partner ﬁrm as an amalgam of m single principal
ﬁrms, with the span of control of each principal being n
m. Given this interpre-
tation, the partnership size indeterminacy is quite natural: since the principals
do nothing productive (apart from designing the contract) the span of control
is immaterial. So without loss of generality, we may set mt =1for all t, and
we may assume that there is a single principal. The results may then be re-
interpreted in the multi-principal case by regarding n as the span of control of
a representative principal2.
2In a model where the partners exert some eﬀort, partnership size might be limited by free
riding between partners (See Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [11] for a model that focuses on
42.2 Eﬃciency
We now show that recursive contracts are always ineﬃcient. The concept of
eﬃciency that we will use is ex-ante Pareto eﬃciency. A contract is eﬃcient if
no generation can be made better oﬀ without reducing the welfare of another
generation. Using the notation set out above, the ex-ante expected utility of
the current generation is (after eliminating w and π)
u = σ
¡
w + πW+ − e(b)
¢




It is worth noting explicitly that the utility of the current principal plays no
direct part in the eﬃciency criterion because his or her utility has already been
accounted for in the utility of agents of the previous generation. The feasibility
constraints on the contract are b ≥ 0, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,a n d0 ≤ W ≤ nσb.
We ﬁrst establish some baseline results that can be used to assess eﬃciency.
It is natural to conjecture that a feasible contract (σt,b t,W t) will be eﬃcient
provided that there is full employment (σt =1 ), that there is eﬃciency in
production in every period (e0 (bt)=1 ). We will conﬁrm this in the two cases
that are of interest to us. We consider ﬁrst the case where it is known that the
ﬁrm will cease to exist after a certain date T.
Lemma 2 (ﬁnite horizon eﬃciency criterion) Assume that the ﬁrm will
cease to exist after a ﬁnite date T, that σt =1for all t ≤ T, that e0 (bt)=1for
all t ≤ T, and that the contract is feasible. Then it is eﬃcient.
Proof. Assume that there exists a Pareto improvement (∆σ,∆b,∆W).
Then ∆u = ∆[σ(b − e(b))] + (∆W+−∆W)
n ≥ 0, with a strict inequality hold-
ing for some generation. But (σ,b) already maximizes σ(b − e(b)) period by
period, so ∆[σ(b − e(b))] ≤ 0. Thus ∆W+ ≥ ∆W. So the change ∆W is non-
decreasing through time. But after the terminal date ∆W =0 , since then W
is constrained to be zero. Thus ∆W =0at all dates. It then follows that
∆u = ∆[σ(b − e(b))] ≤ 0, so the variation cannot have been a Pareto improve-
ment.
We note in passing that the condition in this Lemma is suﬃcient but not
necessary. One can ﬁnd optimal allocations that do not satisfy this criterion.
We now consider stationary allocations, imposing the constraint σ+ = σ,
b+ = b, W+ = W. The ex-ante utility of a representative generation is then
u = σ(b − e(b)).
Lemma 3 (inﬁnite horizon eﬃciency criterion) Consider the stationary con-
tract (σ,b,W).I fσ =1 , e0 (b)=1and 0 ≤ W ≤ nb then the contract is eﬃcient
subject to the stationarity constraint.
free riding).
5Proof. Under stationarity all generations are treated identically, so a Pareto
optimal allocation is simply one that maximizes σ(b − e(b)) subject to the fea-
sibility constraints b ≥ 0, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,a n d0 ≤ W ≤ nσb.F r o mt h ec o n v e x i t yo f
σ(b − e(b)) it follows that this will happen when the constraint 0 ≤ W ≤ nσb
does not bind, σ =1 ,a n db − e(b) is maximized.
We will refer to the contract (σ =1 , W =0 , e0 (b)=1 ), with full employ-
ment, no intergenerational transfers, and eﬃcient production in each period, as
the inﬁnitely repeated myopic contract.
Corollary 2 Under either the ﬁnite horizon assumption, or the constraint of
stationarity, the inﬁnitely repeated myopic contract is eﬃcient. Furthermore, it
yields every agent a strictly positive ex-ante expected utility.
Corollary 3 The recursive contract will always be ineﬃcient.
Proof. Since the individual rationality constraint always binds, the ex-ante
utility of every generation is zero. But by the preceding corollary, there exists
a feasible contract that yields to every generation a positive utility.
The intuition is straight forward. The current principal has monopoly power
to impose a contract on the next generation, and naturally chooses to extract
all the surplus. However the previous principal was in the same position. Going
back through time, everybody loses out.
2.3 Finite Horizon Contracts
We now show how the ineﬃciency of recursive contracts may take the form of a
“rat-race,” with very low (in fact zero) wages, and excessively high eﬀort levels.
The best contract for the principal to oﬀer at time t depends on the expected
partnership proﬁt W+ at time t+1. If agents are optimistic about the future of
the ﬁrm then deferred payment is attractive; but this may not be so if the ﬁrm
is declining. Here we consider the ﬁnite horizon case and compute the optimal










0 b * b
Figure 1. Finite Horizon Contracts
Consider the function φ(b)=b − e(b),w h i c hi ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 . T h ea s -
sumptions on the eﬀort curve imply that φ(b) is strictly concave, that its graph
passes through the origin with a slope that is strictly positive but less than 1,
a n dt h a ti ti se v e n t u a l l yn e g a t i v e . T h u si tc r o s s e st h ea x i sa tap o i n tb ∗ > 0,
and it reaches a maximum at a point b0 such that 0 <b 0 <b ∗. The output
level b0, where marginal eﬀort equals 1,i st h ee ﬃcient output level that would
be chosen by a conventional proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm. For simplicity of exposition
we will call b0 the eﬃcient point3. We will call b∗,w h e r ea v e r a g ee ﬀort equals
1,t h erat-race point.
The principal’s problem is to maximize W
n subject to the constraints W
n ≤ b




rationality constraint). Figure 1 shows graphs of these constraints. Notice
φ(b)+
W+
n shifts vertically up or down as W+ varies, so its maximum remains
ﬁxed at b0. We also note that the functions b and φ(b)+
W+
n cross at the point





,o re q u i v a l e n t l yw h e r e
W+
n = e(b0). There are thus two
regimes, depending upon the size of the future partnership proﬁt W+.
3If b = b0 in all periods then the contract is eﬃcient in the sense of Section 2.2. However
we note that the converse is not true. There may exist Pareto optimal contracts in which
b>b 0 at some dates, due to binding of the w ≥ 0 constraint.
7Regime 1: W+
n <e(b0). In this regime the constraint W
n ≤ b does not bind,
so the principal chooses b to maximize φ(b). Output b i ss e ta tt h ee ﬃcient
level b0, and the wage paid is w = b0 − W
n = e(b0)−
W+
n , which is strictly
positive. The partnership proﬁti sW = n(b0 − e(b0))+W+ >W +.T h u s
partnership proﬁts are declining through time, which has the consequence
that once the ﬁrm enters this regime it will not leave it. The wage paid to
the agents is increasing through time. The output level b = b0 does not
change, and remains ﬁxed at the eﬃcient level.
Regime 2: W
+
n ≥ e(b0). In this regime both the constraints bind, so the con-
tract is pushed away from the eﬃcient production point b0.S i n c et h ec o n -
straint W
n ≤ b binds, w =0and the wage is ﬁxed at zero. In this regime
all rewards are deferred and agents are compensated for their eﬀort only






so output is ineﬃciently high. Since the wage is zero, W











and b+ = e(b). This allows us to explore the dynamics
of the contract. If b = b∗ then b+ = e(b∗)=b∗ = b, so the contract is
stationary. If b>b ∗ then b+ >b ,so output and partnership proﬁts are
growing. If b<b ∗ then b+ <b ,so output and partnership proﬁts are
declining; this is the only type of trajectory that is consistent with the
terminal conditions.
In both regimes we have, by the results of Section 2.1, full employment. So
σ =1and the promotion probability π = 1
n is constant through time and across
both regimes.
We can now get a clear idea of the sequence of contracts by proceeding
backwards from the terminal period. Let the terminal horizon be at time 0.
Since the ﬁrm no longer exists after this date, W+ =0and we are in regime 1,
with b0 at the eﬃcient level, W0
n = b0 − e(b0) > 0,w 0 = e(b0) > 0 and π0 = 1
n;
in fact the value of π0 is irrelevant in this terminal period.
In the previous period the individual rationality constraint shifts upwards.
Let us assume (as in Figure 1) that we are still in regime 1; this will be so
provided that W0




put remains at the eﬃcient value, the partnership proﬁti n c r e a s e st o
W−1
n =
(b0 − e(b0)) + W0
n =2( b0 − e(b0)), and the wage falls to w−1 = e(b0) − W0
n =
2e(b0) − b0.
Moving backwards in time, partnership proﬁt W
n increases until we enter the
second regime, where the constraint W
n ≤ b binds and the wage falls to zero.
The output b rises above the eﬃcient level, tending in the distant past to the
“rat-race” level b∗. Partnership proﬁt also rises as we move back in time. Agents
exert an ineﬃciently high level of eﬀort, they receive a zero wage, and they are
compensated purely by the expectation that they may be promoted.
As noted in Corollary 3, this contract is ineﬃcient. It is instructive to
8consider exactly why the principal chooses such an ineﬃcient outcome4.L e tu s
start ﬁrst with the myopic eﬃcient contract of Corollary 2, which is just the
terminal contract repeated inﬁnitely often. Production is always at the eﬃcient
level b0, the agent receives the whole of his or her output as wage, and there
are no intergenerational transfers. Beginning from this baseline, each principal
would like to extract some rent. There are two instruments that can be used,
w and b. The most straight-forward way to proceed is to reduce the wage w;
by doing so some of the surplus can be extracted without upsetting production
eﬃciency5. However there is a limit to what can be done, because of the non-
negativity constraint on wages6. But the principal is concerned not with ex-ante
eﬃciency but with the ex-post pay-oﬀ, conditional on having been promoted.
Having no other instrument to use, he or she is quite happy to push up eﬀort
levels even at the cost of production eﬃciency.
We summarize as follows.
Proposition 1 Assume that the ﬁrm will cease to exist after a ﬁnite date T.




1.I na l le x c e p tt h el a s tN periods the wage is ﬁx e da tz e r oa n de ﬀort is
ineﬃciently high. In the distant past the output level b tends to the “rat-
race” level b∗; it declines through time towards the eﬃcient level b0.
2. In the ﬁnal N periods output is ﬁxed at the eﬃcient level b0,a n dt h ew a g e
w is positive and increasing through time.
3. The contract is ineﬃcient, yielding an ex-ante expected utility of zero to
every generation.
2.4 Steady State Contracts
As the terminal horizon recedes into the future the ﬁnite horizon contract ap-
proaches a steady state. So we now consider steady state contracts, under the
assumption that the ﬁrm may cease to exist with probability α at any time. This
c a na l s ob ec o n s i d e r e da sam o d e lo fa ni n ﬁnitely lived ﬁrm with discounting.
The contract design problem is now to maximize W = n(b − w) subject to
the constraints
4I would like to thank the members of the theory group at the University of Sydney for a
very lively seminar and dinner where this point was clariﬁed.
5We do not consider here the question of allocative ineﬃciency. See the next section, where
allocative eﬀects are seen more easily.
6Without a constraint that imposes a lower bound on wages no equilibrium would exist.
The model becomes a Ponzi game: the current generation can extract any surplus that they
wish, passing the cost back, generation by generation, into the distant past.
9nπ =1 (4)
w +( 1− α)πW ≥ e(b) (5)
w ≥ 0 (6)
0 ≤ π ≤ 1. (7)
We have imposed the stationarity constraints W = W+,w= w+, π = π+, set
σ =1and normalized the number of partners to 1; the justiﬁcation for this is
s i m i l a rt ot h a ts e to u tp r e v i o u s l y .
W
n
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Figure 2. Steady State Contracts











in the case α > 0, and to
W =m a x{W : W ≤ b,φ(b) ≥ 0}
in the case α =0 . This last case leads immediately to the pure rat-race contract
b = b∗,w=0 , π = 1
n, and requires no further discussion.
10Once again, there are two regimes, depending on how conﬁdent agents can
be about the future.
Regime 1: α >
φ(b0)
b0 . In this regime in this regime the risk of failure is high.
The constraint W
α ≤ b does not bind, so the principal chooses b to max-
imize φ(b).T h u s b i ss e ta tt h ee ﬃcient level b0, and a strictly positive
wage w = b0 −
φ(b0)
α is paid.
Regime 2: 0 < α ≤
φ(b0)
b0 . In this regime it is very likely that the ﬁrm will
continue into the next period, and the constraint W
α ≤ b binds. The
wage is zero, with the agents compensated only through the expectation





b0 . As α → 0 the contract tends
to the pure rat-race contract with b = b∗.
In both regimes there is full employment and the promotion probability is
π = 1
n. Once again, the outcome is ineﬃcient.
As before, it is instructive to see why the principal is prepared to choose
such an ineﬃcient outcome. Consider ﬁrst the eﬃcient contract b = b0, w = b,
W =0 . The principal can improve his or her pay-oﬀ by reducing the wage w,
keeping output at b = b0. This does not disturb production eﬃciency, but it
does lead to allocative ineﬃciency, at least provided that α > 0. To see this,
note that the ex-ante welfare of a representative generation can be written
u = b − e(b) − απW.
Reducing the wage shifts income forward between generations, and incurs the
cost of doing so. In the current model, this cost arises because of the risk
that the ﬁrm might go out of business before the transfer is realized in the next
period. The non-negativity constraint on w means that reducing the wage alone
is not enough to extract all the surplus. So, as discussed in the ﬁnite horizon
model, the principal will also push up the eﬀort level beyond b0.
We summarize as follows.
Proposition 2 Let α be the failure probability.
1.I fα ≤
φ(b0)
b0 then the wage w is zero, and output b is ineﬃciently high,
tending to the pure rat-race level b∗ as α tends toward zero.
2. If α >
φ(b0)
b0 then the output level b = b0 is eﬃcient and a positive wage is
paid; the wage is increasing in α.
3. In all cases the contract is ineﬃcient, there is full employment (σ =1 )
and π = 1
n.
113 Risk aversion and congestion
In this section we investigate the robustness of the conclusions that we have
drawn, by introducing some complicating factors into the basic model.
In both of the models considered so far, there is full employment (σ =1and
π = 1
n)a n dt h eﬁrm can grow to be very large. One consequence is that the
promotion probability of any one individual may become very small, although
the ultimate reward may be great. Another is that the span of control 1
π may
become very large. In this section we investigate the eﬀect of risk aversion, and
of congestion or span of control costs. We are interested in whether these eﬀects
may provide an endogenous limit on the size of the ﬁrm, and whether they may
mitigate the “rat-race” nature of contracts.
3.1 Risk Aversion
Introducing risk aversion into the models as already speciﬁed has a very simple
consequence. There is no intrinsic uncertainty in these models; all uncertainty is
introduced by the contract through random promotion. As discussed in Section
2, the size of the partnership is indeterminate in these risk neutral models.
Uncertainty can be completely eliminated by setting m = n and promoting
everybody. That is to say, instead of giving all of the deferred reward to one
individual we share it equally across the whole cohort.
To eliminate this uninteresting case, it is necessary to make an assumption
that limits the size of the partnership. There are many ways to justify such an
assumption. For example, if partners were required to exert some eﬀort, then
equal sharing will induce free riding, which may limit the size of the partnership.
Here we will simply assume that there is an upper bound on the size of the
partnership, and set that bound equal to 1.
We will also make the simplest possible assumption about risk preferences,
assuming constant absolute risk aversion. Without loss of generality we may
assume that u(0) = 0 and u0 (0) = 1, so that the utility function is a quadratic
of the form u(x)=x − Ax2 with A = −
u00(x)
2u0(x) > 0. We consider steady state
contracts, setting the failure rate α =0 ;so the ﬁrm will with certainty continue
to exist forever.
The contract design problem is to choose σ,w ,π,bto maximize W subject
to
πσn =1
W = σn(b − w)
(1 − π)u(w)+πu(w + W) ≥ e(b)
0 ≤ σ ≤ 1
0 ≤ π ≤ 1
b ≥ 0
w ≥ 0.
12Eliminating w and σ, and expanding the quadratic utility function u as a Taylor
series expansion about b, these constraints can be written
1
n
≤ π ≤ 1 (8)
b ≥ 0 (9)
πW ≤ b (10)
Aπ(1 − π)W2 ≤ φ(b). (11)
where φ(b)=u(b) − e(b). We note that φ is concave, since u is concave and e
is convex. The eﬃcient output level b0 is now characterized by φ0 (b0)=0(this
is the output level at which marginal eﬀort equals marginal utility; this is the
output level that would be chosen by a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm) and the rat-race
level b∗ by φ(b∗)=0 . It is clear that the constraint 11 must bind, for otherwise
W c a nb em a d ea r b i t r a r i l yl a r g eb el e t t i n gb →∞ ; this constraint can be used
to eliminate W, leading to a ﬁnal reformulation of the problem as






≤ π ≤ ¯ π(b).
Here we write ¯ π(b)= Ab2
Ab2+φ(b) = Ab2
b−e(b), a n dw ep u ta s i d ef o rt h em o m e n tt h e
possibility that π =1 .





φ(b) ; but φ(b) − bφ0 (b) ≥ φ(0) = 0, since φ is
concave, so
bφ0(b)
φ(b) ≤ 1 and
bπ0(b)
π(b) ≥ 1. W ea l s on o t et h a t¯ π(b∗)=1and (by
l’Hôpital’s rule) that ¯ π(0) = 0. T h ef e a s i b l er e g i o ni s
©
(b,π): 1
n ≤ π ≤ ¯ π(b)
ª
;
this shrinks to the right as the risk aversion parameter A tends to 0. We also










, which is a
decreasing function of b. In fact, this relationship holds even when π =1 , so no
further separate argument will be needed for that case. For future convenience,
















1 1 n −
b1 b*
Figure 3. The Optimal Recursive Contract under Risk
aversion
We consider separately the optimal choice of π, holding b ﬁxed, and the
optimal choice of b, holding π ﬁxed. The objective
φ(b)
π(1−π) is convex in π and
symmetrical about π = 1
2. Thus, for a given b, the optimal choice of π is π =¯ π(b)
provided that ¯ π(b) − 1
2 ≥ 1
2 − 1
n; otherwise it is π = 1
n. The locus of optimal
choices for π is shown as a solid line in the Figure. Conversely, for a given π
the optimal choice of b is b0 provided that it is feasible; that is if π ≤ ¯ π(b0).
Otherwise it is the smallest value of b such that ¯ π(b) ≥ π. The locus of optimal
choices for b is shown as a dashed bold line in the Figure.
It is now clear that risk aversion (at least under the assumption of constant
absolute risk aversion) will not limit the size of the ﬁrm, and the optimal contract
will always be a full employment contract with π = 1
n. For if not, then the






feasible contract on this locus, and the objective J (b) is decreasing in b along





will dominate any contract for which
π > 1
n.
There are thus two possible types of contract, depending on whether b1 is
to the left or to the right of b0 (both of these points vary with the risk aversion
parameter A, shifting to the right as A tends to 0). Let us write, for the moment,
ψ(b)=b−e(b), let ˜ b be the point such that
˜ bψ0(˜ b)
ψ(˜ b) = 1
n, and let ˜ A be the value




=2˜ A˜ b. One can check that such
14ap o i n te x i s t sa n dt h a tb1 <b 0 if and only if A> ˜ A.
In the ﬁrst regime (low risk aversion), we have A< ˜ A and b1 >b 0. The




. This is a rat-race contract: output and eﬀort
are ineﬃciently high, and a zero wage is paid. As A → 0 it approaches the
pure, risk-neutral rat-race contract. In the second regime, we have A> ˜ A and




. The output level is eﬃcient, and
a positive wage is paid. We summarize in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 If the agents display constant absolute risk aversion then the
optimal contract still leads to full employment. For high levels of risk aversion
the contract implements the eﬃcient output level, and a positive wage is paid. If
the coeﬃcient of risk aversion falls below a critical level then eﬀort is ineﬃciently
high and a zero wage is paid. As the coeﬃcient of risk aversion decreases to 0
the contract converges to the risk-neutral pure rat-race contract.
3.2 Congestion Eﬀects.
Another eﬀect that may be expected to limit the size of the ﬁrm is congestion, or
diseconomies of scale associated with an excessively large span of control when
there are many agents to each principle. To explore this eﬀect we assume that
the agent’s marginal eﬀort depends both on output b and on the the span of
control 1






where γ > 0 is a parameter that indicates the strength of the congestion eﬀect.
We normalize the number of principals to 1, and once again we assume risk
neutrality.








We note (by l’Hôpital’s rule) that π1 (0) = π2 (0) =
γ
φ0(0) > 0, that both func-
tions are monotone increasing, that π1 (b) →∞as b → b∗ and that π2 (b) →∞
as b → b0 (see Figures 4 and 5).
153.2.1 Baseline case
It is useful ﬁrst of all to establish the eﬃcient baseline. Given complete infor-
mation, a proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm would choose σ, π,w ,bto maximize
J (b,π)=nσ(b − e(b,π))
=










where φ(b) − b − e(b), subject to 1
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* b 0 b
() 2 b π
Figure 4. Baseline Contract under Congestion
We note that, for a given b>0,J(b,π) has a global maximum (as a func-
tion of π)i fπ =2
γb
φ(b) =2 π1 (b).T h u s t h e o p t i m a l c h o i c e o f π, holding b






. For a given value
of π,Jis maximized as a function of b if π =
γ
φ0(b) = π2 (b). Thus the optimal
choice of b, holding π ﬁxed, occurs along the locus
©
(b,π2 (b)) : 1




n ≤ π ≤ π2 (0)
ª
. T h e s el o c ia r es h o w ni nb o l di nF i g u r e4 . F o rs i m -
plicity we will assume that n is large enough that the constraint 1
n ≤ π does
not bind, and that γ is small enough that the constraint π ≤ 1 does not bind.
This means that the congestion eﬀect is strong enough to limit the size of the
ﬁrm to less than n, but not to reduce it to a ﬁrm with only a single employee.
16Then the baseline optimal production plan
³
˜ b, ˜ π
´
occurs in Figure 4 where the
two loci cross: it is characterized by the fact that
˜ bφ0(˜ b)
φ(˜ b) = 1




We now consider the optimal recursive contract. The principal’s problem is to
maximize W subject to
1
n
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() 2 b π
Figure 5. The Recursive Contract under Congestion
Assuming again that n is suﬃciently large that the constraint 1
n ≤ π does not
bind, this is equivalent to the problem of minimizing π
b subject to the constraint
π ≥
γb
φ(b) = π1 (b), and the optimal contract is characterized geometrically by
tangency between the curve π1 (b) and the ray through the origin (see Figure 5).
Thus π1 (b)=bπ0
1 (b), which implies that φ0 (b)=0 . Hence b = b0 > ˜ b;o u t p u t
is above the eﬃcient baseline level. However it is not possible to say, without




greater than or less than the base-line ﬁrm size.
17If the constraint 1
n ≤ π binds then the shifts to the right along the π1 (b)
curve, so the output level is even higher.
In either case the constraint πW ≤ b binds, so the agent’s wage is always
zero. We summarize.
Proposition 4 Assume that the ﬁrm is subject to a linear congestion external-
ity of the form e(b)+
γb
π . If nγ ≥ b0
φ(b0) (that is, if the population is large or the
congestion cost is high) then the ﬁrm size is limited to 1
π =
φ(b0)
γb0 <n ,and the
output level b0 is ineﬃciently high. If nγ < b0
φ(b0) then there is full employment,
but the output level b (which is such that
φ(b)
b = nγ) is even higher, tending to
b∗ as γ → 0. In all cases the wage is zero, and the agent is compensated only
through the prospect of promotion.
4 Discussion
In the OLG ﬁrm agents are motivated not only by current rewards but also by
the prospect of becoming principal in the next period, and getting a chance to
set the rules next time round. We ﬁnd that the recursive contracts that emerge
in such an environment are always ineﬃcient.
The typical structure of such contracts is illustrated most clearly by the
steady state rat-race contracts of Section 2.4. Agents are paid a zero wage,
being compensated for their eﬀort only by the probability of promotion. They
work ineﬃciently hard, accepting contracts under which they produce up to the
point where all surplus is dissipated and their average product falls to zero. The
wage is zero because the agents are risk neutral and there is no discounting, so
they do not mind exchanging a current wage for an equivalent future gamble.
But the principal clearly prefers to reduce the current wage to zero rather than
to leave some surplus to the next generation. The eﬀort level is high because the
principal, who designs the contract, cares not about eﬃciency but only about
the ex-post payoﬀ conditional on having been promoted. The agents are willing
to accept such a harsh contract because they can impose a similar contract on
the next generation.
This conclusion seems to be robust to a range of variations in the environ-
ment. In a ﬁnite horizon model, rat-race contracts, with a zero wage and an
ineﬃcient level of eﬀort, can be sustained up until a ﬁnite number of periods
before the ﬁnal horizon. In a stationary model, where the ﬁrm may go out of
business with a constant probability in any period, rat-race contracts can be
sustained if the failure probability is not too great. Rat-race contracts can be
sustained (under constant absolute risk aversion) provided that the degree of
risk aversion is not too great. They can also be sustained under congestion
eﬀects associated with the costs that may be imposed by an increasing span of
control.
There are several interesting areas for further investigation. Bardsley and
Sherstyuk [2], for example, have investigated a recursive contracting model with
adverse selection.
18Recursive contracts may occur in the purest form in overlapping generation
partnership ﬁrms, such as the large commercial law ﬁrm, where there is no
outside equity, and where ownership and control rest with the partners. However
something similar may occur in ﬁrms with a more conventional structure. If
ownership is divorced from day to day control, then there may be a career
structure within the ﬁrm where lower managers hope to be promoted to senior
management, with the right to exercise control. However the extent of this
control, and the contracts which would be designed, would be constrained by
right of the owners to appoint from outside the ﬁrm. It would be interesting to
investigate the recursive contracts that would emerge in this environment.
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